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Abstract: Most of the Social Welfare Functions available in the literature are Paretian, that is increase in 
anybody’s income in the society is welfare augmenting.  The Sen type social welfare function possesses 
this property as well.  However, Paretianity is normative criteria and might not be accepted by everybody.  
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1  Introduction 
  For a complete ordering of different social states a Social Welfare Function 
(SWF) of the Bergson-Samuelson family have been widely used.  An abbreviated 
SWF is a function of per capita income and income inequality of the society.  In order 
to make this idea empirically operational, it is necessary to specify the particular 
functional form.  Inevitably this issue involves a considerable amount of value 
judgement and generates many defensible alternative forms.  Atkinson’s seminal 
paper (1970) indicated a way of ranking alternative social states without specifying 
the form of the SWF.  Lorenz ranking procedure is a widely used approach for 
ordering various social states.  However, this approach has at least two distinct 
problems.  Primarily it gives an incomplete ranking of social states.  Secondly, the 
function underlying the Lorenz principle is such that welfare can be compared only 
when mean incomes are equal.  Shorrocks (1983) using his generalised Lorenz 
dominance approach overcomes the second problem, however the problem of partial 
ranking is not solved.  Furthermore, the welfare judgements embodied in the SWF 
come into conflict with the social desire of more equal income profile than economic 
efficiency.  The common interpretation of efficiency comes from ‘Pareto optimality’.  
The notion of efficiency based on Pareto optimality is not a positive concept.  The 
Pareto optimality criterion is a value judgement, which intentionally avoids 
interpersonal utility comparison.  If a change from allocation x to allocation y makes 
some people better-off but others worse-off, then y is considered neither better nor 
worse than x.  It is in fact simply not ranked, in terms of this criterion x and y are non-
comparable.  No attempt is made to compare among the extent of richness for those 
better off in y to those worse off.  Questions are not asked whether those who gain by 
the change are deserving people while who lose are undeserving.  All such balancing 
out of individual gains and losses are ruled out by this principle.  Although this value 
judgement is designed to be of very general appeal, it is possible that it might not be 
shared by all.  Many may want to weigh up gains and losses of different individuals or 
well-defined groups, to arrive at a definite view of whether some change is good or 
not.  Given that many real world economic policies make someone worse-off, 
decision-makers in fact have to do this all the time.  Since it cannot be used to justify 
an economic policy which makes some people worse-off, it would not rule as a good 
policy which made the very rich a little worse-off and the very poor lot better-off.  
Pareto optimality rejects the ethics that individuals have equal capacity to enjoy a   2
given share of income.  It gives greater weight to the people having higher income.  
With this judgement a growth process accruing money only to the richest person of 
the society is desirable.  Here individual’s utility depends only on his/her own income 
without any reference to others.  By viewing the real world, where for most social 
situations the majority of the population is poor compared to a very small number of 
rich people, it is difficult to accept that the majority would want social policies to be 
formulated on Paretian criterion.  However, the Pareto efficiency criterion is one of 
the desirable properties of a Social Welfare Function.  This paper has considered the 
Sen-type SWF and proposed a generalised form which can be non-Paretian under 
certain circumstances.  The arrangement of the paper is as follows: Section 2 
considers the Lorenz dominance criteria, the third section discuses the abbreviated 
social welfare function.  Section 4 proposed and demonstrated a flexible generalised 
SWF and Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2  Stochastic Dominance and Social Welfare 
  It is the utilitarian assumption that the marginal utility of income is 
diminishing.  That is the higher the initial income, the less the utility derived from an 
extra dollar.  Therefore if the individuals have identical utility functions, that is equal 
capacity to enjoy income, than an equal distribution of an equal amount of income 
maximises social welfare.  A common way of describing income distribution is the 
Lorenz curve, which is defined as the relationship between the cumulative proportion 
of the income units and the cumulative proportion of income received when units are 
arranged in ascending order of income.  If one Lorenz curve lies northeast of another, 
the distribution of income corresponding to the first is better than the latter.  It is 
possible to show that for a quite broad class of SWF, Lorenz ordering can rank 
different social states.  The first important research was undertaken by Atkinson 
(1970)
1; Dasgupta et al. (1973), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) and several others 
followed later.   
 
                                                 
1 Kolm (1966) should be honoured to predate Atkinson’s finding. 
   3
  Let us consider an SWF of the following form: 
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where W(.) is increasing in its arguments.  The SWF is symmetric and S-concave.  
The link between SWF and inequality indices can be summarised due to Kolm (1966), 
Atkinson (1970)
2 and Dasgupta et al. (1973) as: 
 
Given two income distributions with same mean, the social 
welfare of one distribution is always higher than the other if the 
Lorenz curve of the former is always inside that of the later. 
 
The  equivalence of this implies that all S -concave SWF will assign higher 
welfare to the distribution that is ranked higher by the Lorenz criterion.  Thus when a 
ranking is obtained by the Lorenz criterion, it will be in conformity with all S-concave 
SWFs.
3  To provide a more complete ranking when Lorenz curves cross require more 
restrictions to be placed upon the structure of the SWFs. 
 
  The relation between the Lorenz curve and social welfare ranking, concerns 
only the ranking of the income distributions with the same mean level of income.  
Analogous results for the ranking of income distributions with different means have 
been derived by Shorrocks (1983) using the generalised Lorenz curve, obtained by 
scaling ordinary Lorenz curves by the means of the distributions.  It says 
  
W(x)‡W(y) for all nondecraesing SWFs if and only if the 
generalised Lorenz curve of x lies inside that of y, where x and y 
are income configurations of two alternative states. 
 
Hence, Shorrocks result demonstrates that the ranking of two income distributions 
with different means can only be unambiguous if the generalised Lorenz curves do 
                                                 
2 Atkinson provides a continuous version. 
 
3 Slightly different versions of this result can be found in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973). 
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not intersect.  Moreover, it shows that even if ordinary Lorenz curves of two 
distributions intersect, the condition of the generalised Lorenz curve may  still be 
satisfied. 
 
  Kakwani (1984) in an empirical study found that generalised Lorenz curves 
intersect less often than the ordinary Lorenz curves, but in an international 
comparison 40 out of 248 cases generalised Lorenz curves cross.  Shorrocks’s (1983) 
original study on 20 countries produced conclusive results in 84 percent of pair-wise 
comparisons.  It is obvious that if two generalised Lorenz curves intersect, neither 
distribution can be ranked unanimously as welfare superior to the other according to 
every S-concave, non-decreasing SWF. 
 
It is sometimes possible to derive meaningful unanimous preference results by 
restricting the class of SWFs.  The main restriction is to narrow the class of S-concave 
SWFs to those favouring the principle of diminishing transfers (see Kolm, 1976; 
Davies and Hoy, 1987, 1991 among others). 
 
  All these studies failed to provide complete ranking of different social states.  
Atkinson’s (1970) seminal work on second order stochastic dominance has 
considerable theoretical appeal in the arena.  The extension of the theory has 
developed into third degree stochastic dominance (and statistical significance test).  
The two-prong objective of social welfare of increasing both equity and efficiency 
gains little attention.  All these studies concentrate on the equity aspect of the SWF 
and ignore the efficiency aspect.  However, not only the slicing of the cake is 
important, the size of the cake is also important.  The generalised Lorenz dominance 
criterion is too heavily biased towards efficiency.  In this case a moderate increase in 
mean income is sufficient to compensate for an increase in inequality.  Moreover, to 
apply this criterion in international comparison it is necessary to assume implicitly 
that the same relative preference between efficiency and equity is valid for different 
countries.  It may be sensible to emphasise on growth more than equity in a 
developing country, while the emphasis on equity is likely to be higher in a developed 
industrialised country.  Furthermore, Shorrocks’s generalised Lorenz criterion should 
be criticised for its  extreme Paratianity.  ‘Extreme Paretianity’ means a situation 
when welfare of the society increases for the increase of the richest person’s income   5
only, while others’ incomes remain unaltered.  Tam and Zhang (1996) criticised 
generalised Lorenz dominance criterion on this point.  If the richest person enjoys the 
efficiency gain of the entire society whether it is a welfare improvement or not is the 
question.  They have defined a set of SWFs which can be represented empirically by 
dominance relationship and allow for trade-off between efficiency and equity.  The 
acceptable condition for an increase in welfare is that, the cumulative income of all 
the poorer subgroups has to increase, but by  an amount less than the proportionate 
increase in the mean income.  Their SWF,  ) (x
b W , thus has the property: 
(2)  ) ( ) ( x y





















, h = 1,2,…,N and 0 < b <1. 
(m is the mean income) 
Unlike generalised Lorenz ordering, this set of SWFs will not lead to an improvement 
of welfare unless the poorest segment of the society also shares the growth in income.  
Moreover, varying the value of b it is possible to allow different rates of trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. 
 
Clearly, where the value of  b is zero the b-generalised Lorenz dominance 
turns out to be simply the ordinary Lorenz dominance and when b=1, b-generalised 
Lorenz dominance is nothing but the generalised Lorenz dominance.  Thus the 
authors claim that this is an intermediate measure of the two extremes. However, it is 
quite clear that to avoid extreme Paretianity Tam and Zhang (1996) welcomed the 
other extreme, the Rawlsianism.  
 
  Observation indicates that the stochastic dominance criteria have several 
disadvantages to rank alternative economic situations.  The Lorenz dominance has 
excessive equity bias and the generalised Lorenz dominance has profound efficiency 
bias.  The later is extreme Paretian and the  b-generalised Lorenz dominance is 
Rawlsian.  The most serious problem is that the ranking based on these criteria is not 
complete.  An alternative method is the formulation of a Social Welfare Function 
(SWF), the SWF can rank alternative social states in a complete and consistent 
manner.   6
3  The Abbreviated Social Welfare Function 
The concept of SWF originates from Bergson (1938).  The original Bergson 
welfare function was designed to rank not the combination of individual welfare but 
more directly, the combinations of all those variables on which the individual welfare 
depends.  In particular, it includes the goods consumed and the services rendered by 
each of the individuals in the society.  In practice the concept of the SWF emerges in 
the consideration of distributional implications of alternative social states.  Here the 
decision-maker might feel that any reduction of existing income inequality is a good 
thing.  Such a distributional criterion along with an efficiency criterion could be 
assumed to be fulfilled for the recommendation of a particular policy.  Such a dual 
criteria is called an SWF.
4         
 
  The individualistic abbreviated SWF could be represented in the following 
form: 
 
(3)  W = W(S,q) 
 
where S and q are both functions of the x, the income profile of the society.  S is a 
representation of total income of the society, which captures the efficiency aspect.  q 
represents the inequality of income in the society, which captures the equity aspect of 









> < 0 0   and    
that means the SWF is increasing in S and decreasing with respect to q. 
 
The SWF is assumed to be S -concave to incorporate the equity preference 
(means, if there is a transfer of income from a rich person to a poor person the welfare 
of the society will increase).  Besides it is also assumed that differences between 
people, other than income differences, are irrelevant for welfare comparison.  Apart 
from these assumptions another property of the SWF directly follows from its 
relationship with S.  It is called the Pareto principle.   
                                                 
4 However, it is far from the abstract conception of Bergson to encompass all economic criteria in the 
notion of SWF.  See Kondor (1975) for a further discussion. 
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  The Pareto principle says that if there is an increase in income of one person in 
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Actually one person’s increase in income affects the social welfare in two 
ways, firstly, by increasing the total income of the society and secondly, by changing 
the inequality of the society.  If there is a decrease in inequality, it benefits the society 
by two ways.  However, if there is an increase in inequality, according to Paretianity, 
its effect on total welfare has to be less than the effect of efficiency on total welfare.  
















then the SWF will satisfy the Pareto Principle.  This principle deals with the 
‘efficiency’ aspect of the SWF.  The Pareto principle is universally accepted and 
therefore “non-controversial”.  Almost all economists tacitly assume that all SWFs of 
all societies are Pareto-type.  This concept of economic efficiency is assumed to be an 
objective concept which requires the least value judgement.  However, it was argued 
in the context of b-generalised Lorenz dominance that Pareto principle could imply an 
SWF to increase with benefit only to the rich, while the poor continue to retain the 
same absolute share.  Thus this axiom of efficiency might not be the public objective.   
 
To give an example let us consider a society with three persons having 
incomes $10, $1 and $0.  Let due to some growth oriented policy the income profile 
becomes: 

























































The question is whether the social welfare of the society is increasing or not.  
According to the Paretian SWFs, in the above growth process welfare of the society 
increases.  However, it is difficult to accept. 
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  Sen (1974), assuming social marginal utility to be inversely related to income 
rank, has introduced axiomatically an SWF as:  
 
(8)  W = m(1-G),  
 
where m is the mean income of the society and G is the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution.
5  This principal justification for the use of Gini index is related to the 
rank order method of weighting.  Sen (1976) has given further justification for this 
SWF index which is necessary to scale down the conventional national income 
estimates by taking into account the inequality of the distribution.  In other words, Sen 
tried to indicate the twin objectives of efficiency and equality in national 
development.  The Gini index is defined as twice the area between the Lorenz curve 
and the 45
0- line, then (1-G) is twice the area below the Lorenz curve.  By denoting 
Lorenz curve by L(p), the generalised Lorenz curve can be defined as:  
 
(9)  GL(p) = mL(p).   
 
Then the Sen index is twice the area below the generalised Lorenz curve: 
 
(10)  2 1
0
1
GL p dp G ( ) ( ) = - ￿ m . 
 
As the Gini index is some area and can be represented by a single number the Sen 
SWF can rank distributions according to both mean income and inequality in cases 
even where generalised Lorenz curves intersect.  
 
  It is easy to prove that  Sen SWF is an extreme Paretian social welfare 
function (see Mukhopadhaya, 2000).  For the Sen SWF the rate of substitution 
between inequality and efficiency (RTS) at a constant welfare level can be given by: 
                                                 
5 Sen (1976) shows that this index, calculated from income distribution, ‘is a sub-relation of social 
preference relation defined in the distribution of commodities’.  Alternatively, Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) 
showed that this index could be based on relative deprivation.  Sheshinski (1972) also derived this 
index from the Gini coefficient.  Dagum (1990, 1993) arrived at the same SWF from a somewhat 
different premise. 











Clearly the SWF is highly sensitive to mean income and less sensitive to inequality.  
The marginal welfare with respect to mean income, in this case, is (1-G) which is a 
constant.  Thus in the case of international comparison this SWF will always be 
biased in favour of the developed countries, which have high per capita income and 
relatively low inequality.  Also, for any country the welfare status over time may not 
be comparable using this SWF if the country experiences a high growth rate because 
of industrialisation at the cost of adverse income distribution. 
 
In the next section some alternative suggestions are made to restrict the class of SWF 
by weakening the alternative preferences. 
 
4  A Non-Paretian SWF proposed 
In the last section we raised some doubt regarding the universal acceptability 
of the Pareto principle.  The other extreme, Rawlsianism, may not be acceptable 
either.  A sen type SWF of a more generalised class can be considered as follows: 
 
(12)  W = m 
b (1 - G),   0 £ b £ 1 
Equation (9) showed that the Sen SEF can be represented as double the area below the 
generalised Lorenz curve.  Similarly if we represent the b-generalised Lorenz curve 
as: 
(13)  bGL(b, p)= m
bL(p) 
and our generalised SWF can be generated from equation (12) as: 
(14)  ￿ - =
1
0
) 1 ( ) ( 2 G dp p GL
b m b  
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Clearly the decision-maker here has the choice of b and thus the SWF is now flexible 
regarding the trade-off between efficiency and equality.   
 
It is important to examine whether this welfare function is Paretian or not.  
From the condition of Paretianity [equation (5)], the following is required: 






,   for i=1,..,n 
6 
which is always true from the lowest income to t he median income as the left hand 
side of (16) is always positive.  With a knowledge of the existing level of inequality in 
the society, by varying the value of  b, the decision-maker can easily determine a 
change in social welfare when a person, above the median, gains some additional 
income (other things remaining the same).  The SWF of (12) can be Paretian if:  
 






,  [putting maximum value for i in (16)] 
 
As the value of n is quite large we can write this condition as: 
 
(18)  b b + - ‡ G G 1 
 
which will never be satisfied for a value of b less than 1.  Thus this SWF is Paretian 
for the highest possible value of b, in which case this SWF will become the Sen SWF.  
It is obvious from condition (16) that if only the richest person enjoys the fruit of 
growth, the welfare of the society will not increase as long as b<1.  This SWF might 
be criticised for its bias in favour of the poor.  If there is a rise in income of the 
poorest whatever the value of b and G (in the specified range, that is, between 0 and 
1), the welfare must increase.  Thus this SWF has some Rawlsian flavour.  However, 
for a Rawlsian SWF if the richest person’s income increases social welfare remains 
unchanged, but for our SWF (with  b<1) with an increase in income of the richest 
person social welfare decreases.  This class of SWF (with b<1) is not Rawlsian and 
not extreme Paretian as well. 
  
                                                 
6 See Appendix for proof.   11
 
5.  Conclusion 
An abbreviated Social Welfare Function has two arguments efficiency and 
equity.  A Sen-type SWF provides greater emphasis on the efficiency aspect and thus 
in the extreme case where all the fruits of growth go to the richest person or section of 
the society social welfare increases.  This short paper indicates the undesirability of 
such an SWF and proposed a generalised class of SWF, which gives less importance 
to the efficiency criteria, and thus the equity aspect is not eclipsed.  This SWF is not a 
linear function of income.  Unlike the Sen SWF for this type of SWF the decision-
maker has the choice of the rate of trade-off between equity and efficiency.   
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To satisfy Paretianity this expression has to be greater than zero, which means: 
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